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1. Introduction
The Skane Food Innovation Network works to help the food industry innovate, to make the
future happen in a way that includes better food, increased competitiveness for the food
companies within the region and a stronger culinary profile of the region. This chapter aims
at presenting and discussing how a Triple Helix cluster initiative can be managed towards
innovation. Skane Food Innovation Network (SFIN) is a triple helix cluster initiative located
in the South of Sweden. SFIN represents a new type of innovation system. Government aids
to individual corporations are no longer allowed due to EU legislation, which has forced
Swedish public innovation funding to alter its form and organization. Today such funding is
directed to regional industry clusters instead of individual companies. This has prompted
innovation of the Swedish innovation system. SFIN is considered at the front line of this de‐
velopment through its highly developed and consistent triple helix model of innovation
(OECD, 2012).
The chapter reflects upon how the innovation system works, both in practice and in theory.
In practice, it builds on widespread institutional and industry legitimacy, twelve different
networks organized around various nodes in the value system, the interplay between sys‐
temic innovation meetings and the formation of pilot projects, and not least, the direct in‐
volvement of entrepreneurs, customers and the shared value created in the joint action of
the two groups. With a systematic approach - detect, develop and diffuse – to innovation,
SFIN has moved towards a new innovation system.
The chapter builds on the idea of “bridging regimes” (Jönsson et al, 2011) and argues that
innovation could be considered a collective cognitive process. It involves a case, showing
the importance of recruiting intermediators that can bridge the different regimes that are im‐
printed in the actors and make them involved in realizing innovative solutions. Innovation
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inside an existing organization is particularly described and analyzed (Govindarajan and
Trimble, 2010; Kotter, 1985). By innovation itself is meant any process or product that sells
and creates new value in a market (Edquist, 2002). In theory, the innovation system may be
described as a collective cognitive process. The chapter connects theoretical underpinnings
from strategy theory and market theory with models of change, institutionalization and cul‐
ture. Strategy is discussed as a consistent and long-term set of activities (Porter, 1996) and a
clear and understandable modus operandi (Miles and Snow, 1984; Drucker, 1994). The sys‐
tem creates a “liquid environment” and increases the “adjacent possible” (Johnson, 2010),
where ideas are detected and further developed in a market, defined as any self-referencing
group with certain needs in common (Moore, 1991). Such a market view is consistent with
the idea that any innovation established through replication (Christensen et al., 2006) in or‐
der to survive. Once the change is made (Kotter, 1996)– the developed new value creation is
accepted, widespread and taken for granted, the new solution is institutionalized (Veblen,
1904; Hodgson, 1988; Scott, 1995) and part of a specific culture on one or more levels in soci‐
ety (Schein, 2010). The whole process of innovation is about bridging regimes: it could, in
essence, be seen as managing stakeholder perceptions through the three stages of detection,
development and diffusion, on the three levels of individual, organization and society.
1.1. Shaping the shaping of the future food industry
How do you shape the future? As a matter of fact, you don’t have to do anything. It will
shape itself around you, with or without your involvement or approval. But if you have an
idea of what you want to see in the future, there is a challenge ahead. The Skane Food Inno‐
vation Network works to help the food industry innovate, to make the future happen in a
way that includes better food, increased competitiveness for the food companies within the
region and a stronger culinary profile of the region. This chapter aims at presenting and dis‐
cussing how a Triple Helix cluster initiative can be managed towards innovation.
This chapter is about regional economic development and innovation is a key concept. It is
used in the meaning of any process or product that sells and creates new value in a market
(Edquist, 2002). The text revolves around the development of Skane Food Innovation Net‐
work (SFIN). In 2003 - winning the competition Vinnväxt - SFIN was boosted by national
funding the coming 10 years. The objective was to systematically facilitate innovation in the
since long established food cluster in the south of Sweden, also known as Skane. Reading
the official program description today, almost ten years later, it is strikingly void of norma‐
tive guidelines of how to go about creating the innovation system. The purpose of the pro‐
gram, called Regional growth through dynamic innovation systems, is
”to promote sustainable growth in the regions based on international competitive ability, by succes‐
sively developing or further developing the functioning, dynamics and effectiveness of innovation sys‐
tems in functional regions at an international level. A prerequisite for the programme is the active
participation of players from the business community, research organisations, politics and public ad‐
ministration.”
The concept of Triple Helix is mentioned in the original directions. The collaboration be‐
tween business firms, universities and public sector organisation, innovation will result.
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This view of the innovation process could be interpreted in two opposite ways. On one
hand, you could expect innovation as a result of the ”adjacent possible” in a ”liquid environ‐
ment” (Johnson, 2010), where the mere coexistence of different individuals gives the future
new combinations of ideas, DNA, artefacts or other things. This is what Edquist and Hom‐
men (1999) call the ”systems oriented” view on innovation processes. On the other hand,
there is a strong contender in the ”linear” perspective on innovation. Innovation is unidirec‐
tional process, where research and development efforts is initiated by public authorities or
private firms, which is expected to produce new technology, which in turn provides new
solutions to market needs.
1.2. Purpose and approach
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and interpret the development and the dynamics
of the way SFIN facilitate innovation.
By innovation is meant any process or product that sells and creates new value in a market
(Edquist, 2002). In theory, the model may be understood in terms of strategy as a consistent
and long-term set of activities (Porter, 1996) and the need for a clear and understandable
modus operandi (Miles and Snow, 1984; Drucker, 1994). The system creates a “liquid envi‐
ronment” and increases the “adjacent possible” (Johnson, 2010). A market is any self-refer‐
encing group with certain needs in common (Moore, 1991), in which any innovation has to
be established through replication (Christensen, 2006) in order to survive.
A major impediment for innovation tends to be the idea that things should be done the way
they always have been done. Innovations therefore often occur in settings where actors with
different backgrounds join up with a mutual interest to solve the same problem. However,
things can also go terribly wrong if the different backgrounds clash instead of fertilizing
each other. Sidney Winter and Richard Nelson (1982) have discussed the importance of
studying regimes in order to understand why or why not innovations tend to happen. Win‐
ter defines regimes in a sector as a specific set of not only regulative institutions and norms
but regimes also regulate codified formal as well as tacit informal habits and routines relat‐
ed to common collective and individual practices and beliefs. These practices and beliefs
shape and coordinate actions between various groups, individuals, and organizations in the
sector. An important role for organisations working with facilitating innovation may be to
work for “bridging regimes”, as argued in Jönsson et al, (2011).
We are both active in social sciences, business administration and ethnology. We use our set
of models of concepts as ”temporary walking sticks [to] aid sense making as we go along”
(Ghoshal, 2005). Ghoshal questions the pretense of knowledge, resulting from the idea that
social sciences should be formed, tested and verified in the same way as natural science and
causal theories are. Thus, our eclectic approach is a start trying to understand and verbalise
the shaping of the shaping of the future. The approach is to use an eclectic frame of refer‐
ence, where different models and concepts in the field of business administration are put to‐
gether in order to show how concepts of strategy, markets, institutions and culture have
human understanding and acceptance in common.
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Our effort could be labelled action research (Lewin, 1946, Rapaport, 1970, Susman and Ever‐
ed, 1978). Action research is defined by Rapaport (ibid.:499): ”Action research aims to contrib‐
ute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of
social science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical framework.”
The empirical account of the chapter is based on our direct experiences of working inside
SFIN since 2004. We both started off leading different projects for a few years. Since 2008 we
have been part of the management team of SFIN, each heading a separate large operation. In
2010, the Skåne Regional Council, one of the major stakeholders of SFIN, decided to allocate
the initiative Taste of Skane inside SFIN. The assignment is to develop Skane in terms of
food experiences - tourism, restaurants, food education, and much more. In 2011, the same
organisation gave SFIN the assignment of innovating the hospital meals, starting with the
small regional hospital in Trelleborg where a role model is to be presented in early 2014.
So, from an eclectic frame of reference and first hand empirical experiences, this story will
serve two general purposes - making sense of cluster management in SFIN and advocating
the use of individual and common understanding of the subject of change. Individual come
collective understanding, as we aim to show, is at the core of innovation.
2. Skane Food Innovation Network (SFIN)
2.1. The development phases of SFIN
During most part of the 20th century, the Swedish food market has been protected from in‐
ternational competition. The idea of national self-subsistence used to guide Swedish food
policy. International competitiveness was not a major issue, since surplus production was
limited. During the last decades, though, the Swedish food industry has been rapidly chang‐
ing from a sheltered national industry into an industry exposed to strong international com‐
petition (Lagnevik 2006). In 2003, VINNOVA, the state agency for innovation and systems-
oriented research, launched a regionally oriented program for research, technology and
deployment/demonstration (RTD). The aim was to promote upgrading and renewal of local
innovation and R&D capabilities and skill building in certain important growth areas with
strong regional profiles. One initiative within the Vinnväxt (Winn-Growth) program was
granted to the Skane Food Innovation Network, a triple Helix network formed in Skane,
Sweden’s “bread basket” with approximately half of the nation’s food production and R&D.
After winning the Vinnväxt competition in 2003, this first period of the ”cluster initiative”
was research oriented. This ”research phase” saw a large share of the funding funnelled into
research and PhD student projects. It was characterised by a linear view of the innovation
process. As a triple helix organisation, the reactions from the business part of the stakehold‐
ers gradually expressed doubts about how the process should gain their companies. The in‐
herent tension between long-term research and short-term profitability pressures of larger
companies needed to be resolved.
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The former CEO of SFIN retired in 2006, and a new one was recruited. From being an anon‐
ymous ”industry body”, SFIN now got a person with a strong background working with
one of the most successful and innovative Swedish consumer products in a long time.
Around 2007, ”the entrepreneurial phase” began. Now there was an increased support of
entrepreneurs, seen as innovation synapses. It could be regarded a reflex of large compa‐
nies’ urge for here-and-now innovation. SFIN now changed into a rhythm of making more
frequent decisions. Each decision, though, concerned smaller amounts of money. In retro‐
spect, the development could be described as the recognition of the systems view on innova‐
tion. The typical decision was about a business plan or project plan, and a subsequent need
for financial support for implementing it. This kind of decision-making turned out to be
very difficult, sometimes almost ad hoc, and the organisation then was struggling for crite‐
ria from which to evaluate the proposals. The result, and the problem, was that an inconsis‐
tency emerged, no other logic than stimulating individual entrepreneurs in order to create
innovation, new firms and more jobs.
The orientations seen in this first half of the Vinnväxt program are direct reflections of what
was evaluated and, hence, expected from SFIN by Vinnova. The new CEO, slightly flabber‐
gasted, turned to the board for directions. None was given. Instead, the board and CEO to‐
gether began articulating a strategic orientation for SFIN. The approach used was
recognised from straightforward strategic planning and the traditional management of busi‐
ness. State a vision, formulate a mission and set goals and strategies in order to fulfil the
mission. The process was clarifying the ideas and purposes of SFIN. A new organisation
structure was created and still holds sway today.
2.2. The shape of the SFIN innovation system
The Skane Food Innovation Network is registered as a non-profit organisation. Its constitu‐
ents are a number of partners, today about 40, and members, today more than 100. Partners
pay an annual fee of about 4 000 euro, whereas members pay 300 euro. Partners qualify for
board representation, members do not. The board mirrors the triple helix view - large and
small companies, universities, and public authorities are all represented by the eleven board
members. The Governor of Skane is chairman of the board.
The board has formulated a so called ”VAMS”, an acronym for Vision, Business Idea (Swed‐
ish: Affärsidé), Objectives (Swedish: Mål) and Strategies.
The vision states that SFIN is shaping the future food industry and meal experiences. The
business idea is to offer the best network for cooperation of different competences, stage pi‐
lot projects and gain credibility from a concrete track record of innovation. From the high
credibility, SFIN sustain and develop its network and receives funding from national and
international authorities.
The objectives revolve around maintaining the networks in an inclusive manner, and hence
increase the attractiveness and deepen and widen the competence base of the industry.
Strategies are concerned with deep understanding of future needs and questions in the in‐
dustry, creating a clear and attractive offer to participate, attracting people with vision and
The SFIN Innovation System – Reflections on Food Cluster Management
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/53175
631
drive, organising meetings between companies, entrepreneurs, universities and industry or‐
ganisations, focusing commercialisation of innovations, taking the role as the network hub
and constantly communicating our work and existence.
The operating core is organised in six different areas, each headed by one person. The areas
cover as follows:
• Future Strategy: trend spotting, stakeholder relations, governance issues, finance and
funding
• Career: student activities, trainee program, attraction of the food industry
• Entrepreneurship: coaching entrepreneurs in the industry and the adherent support sys‐
tems
• Public Meals: increasing the status and competence of the public meal sector
• Packaging: develop innovative food packaging, small-scale, local producers etc
• Regional Food and Tourism: develop small-scale food producers, food tourism etc
The CEO and the area managers form a management team, also including the communica‐
tions manager and one representative each from the two largest public stakeholders and
funders, Region Skane and the County Council. The management team meet regularly three
hours once a week.
From the different areas, various networks are formed. This model is an offspring from the
initial CEO network, created by the new CEO in 2006. These networks are gatherings
around specific topics, functions or roles in the system. Currently, 12 different networks
meet more or less regularly. Apart from the CEO network, SFIN operates a communications
network, a public meal network, a retailers’ network, an HR network and seven more net‐
works.
The logic is straightforward. In the networks, different ideas surface. Vital ideas, surviving
the initial scrutiny of the network itself, are brought to the management team. The manage‐
ment team discuss the innovation potential of the idea. Today, there is a clear-cut evaluation
criteria. The innovation has to be of a systemic character. There has to be a dedicated entre‐
preneur or coalition ready to test it in a pilot project. Finally, there has to be realistic plans of
how the pilot project could reproduce itself, on commercial merits.
In summary, SFIN has over the past three years been compressed into six ”business areas”, a
coherent network structure, a management control model and three distinct activities under‐
taken in order to create the future food industry and meal experiences: we detect a need or
potential for innovation, we develop the solution in pilot projects, and we diffuse them to a
wider market. This is the SFIN innovation system. This particular ”modus operandi” has
produced a wide variety of both short-term projects and long-term signature co-operations.
The first one was an industry trainee program in open innovation. Another is the training
program for elderly homes, ”Meal Pleasure for Elderly”. A third example is the retail con‐
cept ”Locally Produced and Carefully Selected”.
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On a deeper level, these different examples represent a maturation and consolidation of the
early years of wayward - yet legitimate - experimentation. The strategic planning process
undertaken in 2008 apparently missed out on the emotional aspect of change by avoiding
making a mission statement. The organisation probably was not ready for it, but now the
board and management team increasingly speak in terms of social responsibility, sustaina‐
bility and social capital. The fourth example of this, and a strong confirmation of the credi‐
bility that SFIN has earned over time, is the most recent pilot project situated at the
Trelleborg hospital. In the next section, the case of Meal Pleasure at the Trelleborg Hospital,
will serve as a more detailed look into the dynamics of the SFIN innovation system.
3. The case of meal pleasure at the Trelleborg hospital
3.1. The background
In 2009, the public foodservice sector was slowly introduced into the SFIN operations. It was
obvious that this was a forgotten part of the Swedish food industry. Half of the industry is
foodservice, half is retail and consumer-oriented. Half of the foodservice sector is private
restaurants and service sector offerings (gas stations, Seven Elevens and the likes), the other
half is public sector meals. The major part is served in schools, hospitals and elderly care.
Thus, this forgotten part constitutes one quarter of the entire demand in sales value, even
more in terms of number of people being served. It is a rather consistent segment from a
supplier’s point of view, where public procurement law has streamlined the procurement of
food and meal solutions. The guests, though, is a completely different thing. The elderly
cannot be segmented by age, nor can school kids or patients in hospitals. This is a very de‐
manding part of the food industry with diverse preferences and, on average, weak buying
power.
The public foodservice sector is furthermore signified by a low average educational level, a
predominantly female labour force, low pay, low rate of training and education on the job
and the use of traditional cooking techniques. The most obvious example is the use of high
tech ovens, which in fact are small ”computerised food factories”. Such an oven is expen‐
sive. Still it is often used merely as a traditional oven, a few hours a day, five days a week,
due to lack of education and incentive.
One particular problem, unique to the public foodservice sector, is the obligation to follow
the public procurement law. One important purpose of the law is to optimise the use of tax-
payers money and avoid nepotism. This is done by organised procurement using the com‐
petitive forces in a marketplace. This works, unless there is a dysfunctional market. In the
Swedish food industry, both the retail and the foodservice market are oligopolistic markets.
In the foodservice case, there are two large dominating suppliers. These have been continu‐
ously intimidating municipalities and counties by frequent and systematic legal actions and
court over-rulings of public procurement processes, a tactic aiming at coercing the public or‐
ganisations to behave in a certain way (likely as to benefit large-scale suppliers).
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The educational level of the staff and the status of the foodservice operations are related to
the problem of public procurement. Increasing occupational status and educational level
could make the public foodservice customers more demanding, in that way increasing the
innovation pace in the Swedish foodservice industry. That is the hypothesis that motivated
SFIN to start working with the public sector.
3.2. The rationales of the Trelleborg project
Region Skane, the county council, is responsible for healthcare, transportation, cultural and
regional development of Skane. It has offered continuous support of SFIN since the start in
1994. Gradually, the confidence in SFIN has increased. In 2009, with 2012 looming, the need
for a new procurement of hospital meals for about two thirds of the healthcare organisation
was pressing the politicians. The same year, a hospital food process investigation was initi‐
ated. The result was a vision for making Skane a role model in food and meals in Northern
Europe by 2025.
It was an ambitious vision and it was necessary to take action. A senior foodservice ”celebri‐
ty” working for SFIN saw it coming and used her leverage in the political sphere in Region
Skane to suggest a pilot project to ”walk the talk”. Said and done, a pilot project in the small
local hospital of Trelleborg; was decided upon. There was an existing kitchen ready to
use. ”Just dust it off and get it running”, we were told.
Apart from starting up a dormant kitchen and start cooking tasty food, the short-term goal
was, and still is, to innovate the hospital meal experience and to integrate the meal into the
healthcare operation. In other words, we got an opportunity to give the meal a higher status
in hospitals. The longer-term goal was set to disseminate the idea, to diffuse the model. This
is done in SFIN by way of entrepreneurial incentive. This was decided in the early summer
of 2011, just before the holidays. In August that year, the adventure started.
3.3. The SFIN networks paying off
SFIN got the assignment from the board of Region Skane, along with funding for two years.
This funding covered SFIN expenses for the project, not for investments or employment of
staff or other Region Skane-related costs. The line-up from SFIN was possible to achieve as a
direct result of the network organisation. Various SFIN projects in the past had made it pos‐
sible for a rather unique and unorthodox set of project members to form.
The common denominator of this group is a genuine interest in making a difference. Nor‐
mally, there is an obvious attraction to public funding as ”easy money”, but these people all
work long-term with SFIN on reasonable market-based terms.
Initially, the SFIN manager Knutsson worked as a project owner in SFIN alongside with two
experienced and highly respected persons. Together, these three people formed a project
core group and started to write a project plan. The project plan was accepted by the respon‐
sible politicians in late August 2011.
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The project organisation consisted of a political steering committee, a managing steering
committee, a work group and a reference group. SFIN participated in all groups. The rest of
the participants varied, but represented either the Region Skane corporate level, the Region
Skane business development, the Trelleborg hospital or Regionservice (the facility manage‐
ment part of Region Skane coordinating real estate, food, transportation, laundry, and postal
services).
At the time in Region Skane, each hospital manager was responsible for all service opera‐
tions, including the food process, and the organisation of the healthcare. Regionservice had
the role of an in-house service integrator, coordinating the service activities in the entire or‐
ganization.
There were three distinct stakeholders. The hospital of Trelleborg, Regionservice and SFIN.
In this context, SFIN was a fairly unknown organisation of (”self-entitled?”, some whis‐
pered) experts in the field, who had been given a powerful position in reshaping the hospi‐
tal foodservice in Trelleborg and, more or less explicitly expected, the rest of the Region
Skane hospitals. Adding to that, Regionservice had a rather bad reputation in the hospitals,
not meeting expectations. Naturally, Regionservice representatives were suspicious and -
perhaps - offended by the political decision to invite an innovation organisation from the
outside ”that no-one ever has heard of”. Moreover, the project was running against the
clock, as the contract with the external food supplier was to expire 31 August 2012. Region‐
service, the coordinator and recipient of the SFIN innovations, had 15 months to go.
3.4. Colliding regimes – The first year’s theme
The first meeting with a group from Regionservice and the Trelleborg hospital was held be‐
fore the summer, before there was a project plan written. This was the first step in cooperat‐
ing. The meeting was marked by confusion. There was no previous relations in the group to
rely on. Knutsson, chairing the meeting, had nothing but a generally formulated political de‐
cision to hold on to. Focus was naturally put on the ”dusting off” the hospital kitchen.
SFIN, represented by an experienced, renowned and respected chef, made an initial sketch
of the kitchen layout on the basis of available blueprints. The Regionservice real estate divi‐
sion appointed a project leader to organise the starting up the kitchen. This was a young and
inexperienced person, as fresh as they come, who got this assignment as her first project.
The tight time schedule and the goal to create something entirely new clashed. Soon it was
discovered that the previous check of the building, about one year old, had been rough and,
as it showed, insufficient. The original estimation was 11 MSEK. It rapidly grew to specula‐
tions of 70 MSEK. The needed capacity was 500 meals per day. Any sound investment calcu‐
lus became impossible. Thereafter, Regionservice got silent and started its own investigation
of the Klippan kitchen without the participation of SFIN.
There was obvious tension between Regionservice and SFIN. The director of support and
service functions in Region Skane was contacted and introduced to the need to strengthen
the Regionservice commitment to the collaborative nature of the project. A collaboration
document was written and acknowledged. But the Regionservice investigation was already
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on its way and the door was not opened to SFIN. At that time, it was also decided by the
board of Region Skane that Regionservice should take on the direct responsibility for all
support functions. That meant that the hospitals were relieved of the support functions, ef‐
fective January 1, 2012. This stirred things up in Region Skane and the pilot project did not
go unaffected. Regionservice got more powerful and the door to SFIN seemed firmly shut.
In late January, the door came ajar, though. Suddenly, the real estate project leader forward‐
ed a number of detailed questions from their kitchen architect and kindly asked that we re‐
spond the same day.
In the meantime, two people – one dietician and one gastrome – built a remarkable base of
knowledge and learnings about the meals in the Trelleborg hospital. The explicit goal was to
observe and analyse the potential and need for change in the meal organisation and the
quality of the patient’s meal experience. They worked in an exploratory fashion and became
more and more independent of the project leader, working increasingly with the kitchen is‐
sue and the collaboration between Regionservice and SFIN. The first half of 2012 was a peri‐
od where the project goals first got under real scrutiny. What does it mean to ”innovate the
hospital meal experience and to integrate the meal into the healthcare operation”? Frequent‐
ly the phrase ”establish a new norm for hospital food” was used in SFIN. That did not bring
light to the more and more blurred question - ”What do we have to do?” The pressure in‐
creased further from an increasing interest and high expectations of the project. And here
we were, fumbling for structure and some guidance. And what about the food, where did
that go in this huge project?
A hospital kitchen is an important part of the infrastructure. There is a certain minimum ef‐
ficient scale, given the choice of building, production methods and technology. In the spring
of 2012, there was hardly enough expected volume to guarantee an acceptable cost per meal.
The projected daily volumes included 300-350 meals to the hospital and about 150 meals to a
new psychiatric unit in Trelleborg (RPC), starting up in 2016. 500 meals per day rendered an
unacceptable production cost and the entire credibility of the project was being questioned.
In that situation, the municipality of Trelleborg caught the project’s interest. In the munici‐
pality, there was a commonly known need to invest in new elderly care meal solutions. Con‐
tacts were made and a letter of intent was written in the spring. Left with a need to find out
ways to share the meal organisation, this was a crucial step that in one blow could double
the projected production volume in the kitchen. Also in the late spring of 2012, the political
decision was made to invest in total 50,1 MSEK in the Trelleborg kitchen. And the project is
delayed by one whole year. With the decision finally at hand, the building process got off to
a new start. There was a new building meeting and in that meeting, there was a complete
breakdown of communication between SFIN and Regionservice.
The demand and expectations from the hospital, RPC and seven different elderly homes in
the town of Trelleborg turned out to be difficult to capture and align. The picture of the total
demand was very blurred and the design of the kitchen and logistics turned out to be a bad
compromise. A calm and focused foodservice manager in Regionservice now entered the
project in order to strengthen the project in the eyes of Regionservice and, in some respect,
mediate between SFIN and the real estate project group. In order to get hold of the produc‐
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tion model, it became necessary to take a stand on the food issue - do we transport hot or
cold food, or both? The decision was made by the experienced chef representing SFIN, in
mutual understanding with the foodservice representative from Regionservice, to go with
the cold alternative. The decision to work with chilled food was supported by the politi‐
cians, and opened up a possibility to solve the problem of supplying food to other hospitals
in Skane. If the Trelleborg kitchen was expanded, it could serve so much more than merely
the few patients and persons in Trelleborg. This, of course, had ramifications on the building
project. But the political negotiations were kept secret. Knutsson was allowed to break the
news of going for chilled food in a construction meeting. The impression was that SFIN had
surrendered and resorted to the cook/chill method. In the meantime, a plan was outlined for
a larger solution, which the politicians initially at first supported. However, one week later
there was a 180° turn, and the old plan was only reconfirmed by the politicians. All of this
wheeling and dealing went unmentioned to the real estate project group and it was no won‐
der that SFIN lost credibility in that group. That wasn’t enough. The hospital management
in Trelleborg had been completely forgotten in this intense and extremely pressured situa‐
tion and was not happy.
3.5. Current state
As the last steering committee before the summer ended, no decision had been made to re‐
organise the project. As it happened, the project leader met with the service director/project
owner the same morning. Referring the meeting, the project leader got an immediate posi‐
tive response and the service director offered himself to chair the steering committee and to
supervise a revising of the project plan and the project organisation.
So, as the summer is almost gone, the project is now divided into four distinct parts of the
project (construction, food, meals, and continuous operations). In this scheme, SFIN has now
got an explicit development and innovation responsibility for on one hand the kitchen de‐
sign and a distinct food strategy, and on the other hand the meal experiences of patients,
staff and visitors. The construction part of the project now resides directly under the service
director. Articulated goals are now present in each respective part. All in all, order has been
reinstated and roles and responsibilities are now much clearer.
In Trelleborg, base groups are formed within each clinic, and the hospital management is
engaged in the formulation of the Trelleborg policy of patient meals. In that policy, the inte‐
gration of hospital meals into the healthcare operation resides. The construction planning is
underway, and a new, healthy menu is currently planned.
Of course, it remains to be seen, but by early 2014, SFIN and Regionservice will present a
new way of working with food in the hospitals of Region Skane. The meal organisation is
revamped, the status of the meals is increasing and the quality of the hospital food is dra‐
matically improved by new production and distribution methods. Moreover, the cost of hos‐
pital meals is lower than before and the new kitchen turns the conception of high quality
foodservice production upside down. From the rest of the country and from other parts of
Europe, people start to benchmark and copy the new norm of hospital food, established by
SFIN in tight cooperation with Region Skane. Fingers crossed.
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3.6. Case study learnings
This case is a story where we want to show more details of the innovation process. We will
dwell somewhat upon the difficulties we have experienced from working side by side, with
an established organisation.
The story began with the importance of confronting the basic concept of value creation.
Change stemmed from an understanding of (the potential for) value creation, in this case
supported by external knowledge and experience, but also a strong political awareness and
desire to improve the meals served at the Region Skane hospitals. The staff working in the
areas in need of change did not, however, recognise the need to the same extent. This was an
important learning in the project. Every organisation is shaped to produce a certain out‐
come. Ongoing operations create, over time, an inertia and inability to adapt to change. One
of the participants in the project, a former foodservice manager, drily summed up the opera‐
tion in one kitchen by saying ”this is like it was 25 years ago when I left it”.
This pointed to the need for implementing the wish for change to the staff. The success of
an organisation is  contextual,  every organisation is  part  of  a  larger  system.  The supply
chain of the hospital food operation relies on education, procurement, IT cooperation be‐
tween different occupational groups and so on. To isolate and dissect a single part of a
system in order to change only that particular part is doomed - the surrounding system
will rein in the deviant.
Innovation is based, the case shows, on every individual’s understanding, acceptance and
estimation of the value of the ”new thing”. It was most difficult to convey to large groups
of people that we shouldn’t talk about just food, we had to take the entire meal into con‐
sideration. Hospital staff may have longed for ”finally getting better tasting food” but the
foodservice organisation had a clear view that ”cook/chill food is lousy!”. This was the re‐
al challenge of innovation, finding the motivation and mutual understanding among the
kitchen staff and hospital staff at one hand, and the external innovation facilitating actors
at the other. We needed to initiate and encourage change agents in a long-term process of
changing attitudes and conceptions of how the meals in hospitals are valued and, hence,
organised.
We tried to derive changing attitudes, values and conceptions to individuals influencing in‐
dividuals. The case reveals the importance of tasting sessions, to organise ”base groups” at
every single clinic and to align top management support, middle management involvement
and floor management dedication.
In essence, this is an argument for treating the innovation process as a cognitive process
rather than the physical implementation of new work routines. The innovation in this case is
the reconceptualisation of a hospital meal.
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4. Innovation in the light of strategy, markets and institutions
Looking at the Trelleborg case from a strategic point of view may give further insight on
how actions can be planned in order to succeed in innovation facilitation. First of all, the
way that SFIN runs its course follows the strategic planning paradigm. But, just to conceptu‐
alise a management system in terms of a list of words will not suffice. From theory we can
deduce a certain frame of reference, guiding both sense-making and action-taking. The argu‐
ment is the following:
• strategy is about understanding how you create value to a customer
• the flipside of a good strategy is inertia and a compromised ability to adapt to change
• success is contextual, every organisation is part of a larger system
• innovation is based on every individual’s understanding, acceptance and estimation of
the value of the new thing
• individuals are influenced by other individuals;
• innovation, defined as ”any process or product that sells and creates new value in a mar‐
ket” (Edquist, 2002) is built on a collective cognitive process;
• The SFIN innovation system is built around a systems view on innovation and concerns
the management of cognitive processes triggered by the meeting between people.
4.1. Innovation and strategy
Strategy has an everyday connotation as a plan. It is implicitly rational, built on analysis and
take its form as an ex ante decision to make something special to happen. There is a wide
literature on the concept of strategy, but a convergence could be discerned from a number of
scholars in the past. In 1975, the Swedish scholar Richard Normann (1975) defined the way a
company could dominate competitors, i.e. strategy, as an interplay between the organisa‐
tion, its products and its markets. Strategy, Mintzberg (1978) has defined as ”a pattern in a
stream of decisions”. A continuation of that definition is recognised in Miles and Snow
(1984) and Porter (1996), who define strategy as a matter of activity fit. What counts is what
you do, in total.
Miles and Snow (ibid.) present fit in terms of integration of an organisation’s strategy, struc‐
ture and management processes. Misfit breaks down an organisation, whereas tight fit
is ”the underlying causal dynamic producing sustained, excellent performance and a strong
corporate culture” (1984:10). Early fit is the discovery and articulation of new patterns of
strategy, structure and process and fragile fit signals vulnerability to change. Tight fit, thus,
is the objective for adaptation. Tight fit is built upon
• discovery and establishment of a seemingly easy way to work together towards a chosen
goal,
• simplicity and increased understanding by incumbents
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• reduced need for elaborate coordinating mechanisms, creating slack resources to be re-al‐
located.
• the causal association between the way to work and achieved performance.
Miles and Snow combine the classic thoughts of Selznick (1957) with similar ideas of Nor‐
mann (1975, 2001) and Porter (1980, 1985, 1996). The easy way to work, well understood by
incumbents, could be regarded as a distinctive competence (Selznick, ibid.) and an interplay
between the mental models of people, institutionalised organisational behaviour and the
way a company runs its business. Normann (2001) indicates that a ”business landscape”, i.e.
an industry structure and its prevailing business logic, could be a result of the ”mental
maps” of people. Drucker (1994) calls the same thing ”the theory of the business”. A later
heir of these ideas is Jim Collins (Collins, 2001, Collins and Hansen, 2011), who in a massive
empirical material derives an explanation of the success of certain companies. It is from dis‐
ciplined people, thoughts and actions superior performance stems. In the healthcare organi‐
zation of Region Skane, this is expressed in distinct occupational roles and a strong
hierarchical organization. Even though people have to eat, and our wellbeing depends very
much on what we eat, people in the medical profession seldom considers how the patient’s
eating affects its recovery. The “mental map” of healthcare needs to be redrawn.
4.2. Strategy, inertia and the difficulty of surprise
When, in SFIN, we speak about getting the unexpected to happen, there is one problem with
innovation and strategy. Strategy is a matter of pattern, routines and familiarity. March
(1991), among many others, is preoccupied with the choice a firm has to make between ex‐
ploiting ”old certainties” and exploring new possibilities: ”The essence of exploitation is the
refinement and extension of existing competences, technologies, and paradigms. Its returns
are positive, proximate, and predictable. The essence of exploration is experimentation with
new alternatives. Its returns are uncertain, distant, and often negative. Thus, the distance in
time and space between the locus of learning and the locus for the realization of returns is
generally greater in the case of exploration than in the case of exploitation, as is the uncer‐
tainty.” (1991:85)
This frames the challenge of SFIN and other innovation organisations: how do you help an
organisation close the gap in time and space, i.e. between innovation experiments and prof‐
itable growth of business? The wider the gap, the less interested an organisation is to bet on
something other than the proven way. Christensen (1997) distinguish between disruptive
and sustaining innovation, where sustaining innovation is an incremental development of
the existing products or methods. Disruptive innovation changes the game, for the customer
or the organisation or both. Digging further down the theoretical underpinnings of innova‐
tion, Argyris and Schon (1978) introduced the idea of single and double loop learning to a
wider public. Learning in a single loop is to learn to do better what you already do. Double-
loop learning occurs when you question why you are doing what you do in the first place -
you test the assumptions, values and policies underlying the particular action.
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So, the sustaining innovation is a matter of improvement of the existing solution to a prob‐
lem. You run your thoughts through a single loop - how can we do this better? The degree
of surprise by the unexpected is limited. Disruptive innovation, though, is by definition
something other than the existing thing. Then, when you enter a ”going concern”, the ac‐
countant’s label on an organisation expected to live long, and you should get the unexpect‐
ed to happen, you could expect resistance.
In more practical terms, Govindarajan and Trimble (2010) differentiate between the main or‐
ganisation, what they call the ”performance engine”, and the innovation organisation,
the ”dedicated team”. In order to succeed with exploration, call it innovation, the dedicated
team has to work alongside with the people in the performance engine. A partnership has to
be established between the exploring and exploiting parts of the organisation.
The main issue, Govindarajan and Trimble argue, is the work relationships among the par‐
ticipating members and decision-makers. Work relationships are analysed in terms of depth,
power balance and operating rhythm. Deep relationships are defined as a continuous and
tight relationship where two or more people work together with a specific problem. Power
balance is a matter of influence and having the final say. It doesn’t rely on individual per‐
sonal authority, but rather the primacy of certain organisational functions over other. Last,
the operating rhythm concerns the pace and intervals in which the cooperating organisa‐
tions work - if one part work in a monthly budgetary cycle and the other in a three-year de‐
velopment process, the operating rhythm will cause the work relation to wither.
What Govindarajan and Trimble teach us in SFIN is, at the very least, that as soon as we
enter an existing organisation with an innovation mission, we must take good care of the
work relationships we establish. Infrequent, casual meetings with imbalanced power distri‐
bution - one way or the other - and differing time horizons, we are by and large bound to
fail to innovate. If we don’t get to understand each other, the existing view of reality will
prevail. In order to redraw the mental maps of the hospital staff to include the hospital
meals as an integrated part of the healthcare, we need to get our “partners” in the “perform‐
ance engine” Regionservice and the Trelleborg hospital to take the patient meals in a double
loop – why do we serve meals in the first place? We have to do this in close work relations,
where we need to engage deeply in the realities of kitchen staff and healthcare staff, so that
we can better understand how people think about and value the work they do. The change
doesn’t start from our standpoint, it starts from theirs.
4.3. Innovation, markets and other institutions
The problem of innovating inside an existing organisation could be further discussed in
terms of diversity and interdependence in the organisation (Kotter, 1985). Kotter claims that
the larger the organisation, the harder it is to run it efficiently. If we look closer to his ex‐
planation, again work relations between people is the object of interest. His argument goes
that a smaller organisation, with a narrow scope of technology, products and markets, cre‐
ates less confusion and disputes than in larger organisation. The larger organisation de‐
pends on many people working together, so when interests divert among these
interdependent individuals, the organisation gets stiff and bureaucratic. Kotter ponders: ”it
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is not by chance that the economist’s traditional model of a firm, where only ‘rational’ economic deci‐
sion making occurred, and where power struggles and politics were nonexistent, was a small and
technologically simple organization that operated in an environment without large customers, suppli‐
ers, unions, or governmental regulators, and that employed a relatively homogeneous labor force in a
simple organization structure.” (Kotter, 19851). Thus, as soon as the organisation grows, the di‐
versity and interdependence in existing relations have to be managed and led.
Max de Pree in his book ”Leadership is an art” (1987) made a classic statement about lead‐
ing an organisation - ”the first responsibility of a leader is to define reality. The last is to say
thank you. In between, the leader is a servant.” In case of an organisation needing to change,
the leader has to spell it out. Kotter (1996) has designed an eight-step model of change,
claiming the need to explain, motivate and sustain the change. The now and here must be
described, but also the then and there: where are we and where are we going. A small core
of people, the ”guiding coalition”, has the initiative, but in order to succeed, more and more
people have to be involved. One important motivator for others to engage is ”short-term
wins”, necessary to underscore the meaning of and reward from participating. Kotter ends
his list with the need to persevere and to gradually institutionalise the changes. New behav‐
iour has to be established. If we choose to define ”institution” as a pattern of routinized be‐
haviour (Veblen, 1904, Hodgson, 1988, Scott, 1995, Cohen et al, 2004), the links between
individual understanding, actions and innovation are again in focus. When changes are in‐
stitutionalised, the diversity of action and interdependences are not considered.
Yet, the diffusion of certain behaviour is not automatic. Once the leader has pointed out the
way, ”defined the reality”, people need to follow. Think about this definition of a market. A
market is i) a set of actual or potential customers, ii) for a given set of products or services,
iii) who have a common set of needs or wants, and iv) who reference each other when mak‐
ing a buying decision (Moore, 1991). There is a direct link between Kotter’s (1996) eight-step
change model and this view of a market. First, there has to be a need for the new thing. Then
a group has to advocate the new thing and persuade others to buy it. Transferred to the con‐
cept of innovation, defined as ”any process or product that sells and creates new value in a
market” (Edquist, 2002), it is deeply dependent on a cognitive process where an idea roots
itself and grow stronger as more and more people see it and value it. A successful innova‐
tion has gained a critical mass of buyers. A product offered by a company creates value to
its buyer, otherwise there will be no repeat buying, nor any persuading elaborations to other
potential buyers about the good qualities of the product.
The group that formulates the Trelleborg policy for patients’ meals sets the stage for the
base groups, which are now being formed and activated in the hospital. The base group ac‐
tivity is a conscious move to have the people reflect upon what they do and to discuss it
with each other. In that way, under the supervision of the project members, there is a clear
“guiding coalition” creating a sense of urgency. From this, the base group activities reduce
1 Here is an example of how innovations challenge existing norms. The Kotter book Power and Influence was read on
an iPad, the new way of reading. In there, the pages are dynamically paginated. The traditional way to refer to a quote
hence needs a paper copy - the old way is supported by norms and standards.
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the diversity of the staff’s different conceptions of a hospital meal. This is the first ripple
across the mental map of hospital food being redrawn.
5. Bridging regimes to boost innovation
The distance between the concepts of market, institution and culture could be seen as great.
However, if we take the above definitions as our viewpoint and listen to Schein (2010) and
his definition of group culture, the close relation between the three appears clearly and in‐
terestingly. The culture of a group Schein defines as ”a pattern of shared basic assumptions
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” (2010:36). In the western business
community, there is an adage that ”culture eats strategy”. This means that no matter what
strategy companies formulate, the implementation will be determined by the culture of the
organisation. Culture is based on past experiences, what has been working. Strategy, de‐
fined as a plan, is about future competition and profits. Culture is based on inductive emo‐
tional consequence, strategy is based on deductive rational choice. The statement could be
tested on other cultural levels than the organisation.
Culture, Schein (ibid.) suggests, could observed on a macro level (national, ethnic), organisa‐
tional level (private, public, nonprofit, government), on a sub level (occupational) and on a
micro level (units, teams, groups within a larger organisation). Thus, if we extend the argu‐
ment of culture eating strategy, it becomes imperative to take existing cultures into account
if enduring change is wanted. In that sense, there is wind in our sails now, as the Swedish
healthcare establishment increasingly directs attention to deteriorating hospital food. How‐
ever, the real challenge of re-conceptualizing the hospital meals is found at the occupational
and work group levels. These cultures need to be confronted and overtly discussed if they
are to be altered. And to the extent they are, the innovation project will succeed.
Following Levinthal (1991) and Scott (1995) regimes have three dimensions: i) cognitive
rules, related to belief systems, ii) normative rules expressed in missions, goals, and identity,
and iii) strategies and strategic orientations towards the surrounding external socio- techni‐
cal and politico–economic environment.
The Trelleborg case shows the three dimensions in relation to the re-conceptualization of a
hospital meal. There were plenty of cognitive rules about how a hospital meal should be,
that turned out to be an impediment for innovation, sometimes in direct conflict to the nor‐
mative and strategic dimensions. Furthermore, the regimes of the public staff, the political
level and the innovation facilitating actor (SFIN) were difficult to bridge, as shown in the
initial conflicts about the hospital kitchen.
The road to successful innovation work turned out to be the combination of people that
could function as intermediaries between the different regimes in action. People working for
SFIN had credibility among the hospital staff, while the experienced and renowned chef’s
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knowledge of food preparation could not be disputed. The SFIN project leader turned out to
have unknown skills for intermediating between the outside organisation and the higher ad‐
ministrative and political level.
There is still work to be done before the new paradigm of hospital meals is successfully
launched in Trelleborg, especially the implementation at ground level. The innovation is not
a success until all levels are imprinted with the mission for change.
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